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AND THE

CLOSING OF PUBLIC FACILITIES

Pursuant to a judgment declaring that the operation of segregated public recreation facilities in Jackson, Mississippi, was a
denial of equal protection of the laws,1 the city council desegregated the city's parks, auditoriums, golf course and zoo, but closed

the public swimming pools. Two of the pools were transferred to
private organizations and apparently reopened on a segregated
basis. Plaintiffs instituted an action to force the city to reopen
the pools on a segregated basis. The federal district court held
that the closing was not violative of the equal protection clause2
and the court of appeal affirmed.3 The United States Supreme
Court held, that the closing of the pools was not a denial of equal
protection of the laws and judicial inquiry into the motivation
behind the closing was improper. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct.
1940 (1971).
The genesis of "equal protection" was the adoption of the
equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment. 4 The
Court, in Strauder v. West Virginia,5 interpreted the amendment
as primarily prohibiting discrimination against Negroes by state
governments. This proscription was applied to public facilities in
Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which established the "separate but equal"
1. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), ajJ'd, 313 F.2d
637 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
2. This opinion is not officially reported, but is referred to in the instant
case. See Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1942 n.1 (1971).
3. Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
5. 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880): "It [the equal protection clause] ordains
that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. What Is this but declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in
regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law
because of their color. The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctly as colored,-exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject
race."
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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doctrine.7 The doctrine was eventually rejected, however, when,
in Brown v. Board of Education," the Court held that separate
facilities were inherently unequal and constituted a deprivation
of equal protection of the laws. Thereafter, the doctrine of Brown
was applied to other public facilities-public golf courses, 9 municand comipal theaters, 0 public beaches and bathhouses," busses
4
3
mon carriers, 12 public parks,' and swimming pools.'
Prior to the instant case, the Court had not decided the specific issue of whether or not the closing of public facilities was a
denial of equal protection. However, several cases decided by
the Court were peripheral to that issue. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,'5 certain Louisiana statutes were attacked on
the grounds that they perpetuated segregation in the state school
system. Through the statutes, the Governor was given the power
to close any school in the face of integration.' 6 The statutes were
7. After citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the
Plessy Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment as enforcing political,
not social, equality. The Court held that a statute permitting separate accommodations on trains was not unconstitutional as long as the accommodations
were equal. The Court concluded by stating that "[i]f the two races are to
meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities,
a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do
so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If
the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to
the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
8. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The Court stated that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold, that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated ... are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
9. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), aff'd mem., 350
U.S. 879 (1955).
10. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953),
aff'd mem., 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
11. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.
1955), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
12. Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd merm., 352
U.S. 903 (1956).
13. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122
(5th Cir. 1958), aff'd mem., 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
14. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313
F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
15. 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
16. These Louisiana acts included the following: La. Acts 1958, No. 256
(giving Governor the right to close any school that was integrated); La.
Acts 1960, No. 495 (giving Governor the right to close all schools if one were
integrated); La. Acts 1960, No. 542 (giving Governor the right to close any
school threatened with violence or disorder).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

declared unconstitutional because they permitted the state to
close integrated public schools while maintaining an otherwise
segregated public school system.
Later in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County,'1 7 the State of Virginia closed the county schools but
maintained private schools with public funds. The Court held
that closing the public schools while, subsequently, supporting
the private system was a scheme to perpetuate segregation and,
hence, a denial of equal protection. In another equal protection
case, land was conveyed to the City of Macon, Georgia, under a
testamentary trust, to be used as a park for the enjoyment of
white persons exclusively. In an attempt to preserve the segregated nature of the park, its managers sought to have the city
removed as trustee because the city could not legally enforce
racial segregation. However, the Court held in Evans v. Newton,18 that the park was subject to the fourteenth amendment
regardless of who held title, because the city still retained some
control over the facility.' 9
Paralleling the development of equal protection has been the
development of the Court's policy of refusing to inquire into the
motives and purposes behind a legislative act. The Court in
Fletcher v. Peck2° voiced the earliest rejection of such an inquiry;
most opinions rendered thereafter have been in accord with
Fletcher.2 1 Recently, in United States v. O'Brien, the Court stated
that "[i]t is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
17. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
18. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
19. In the subsequent companion case of Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970), the Court ruled that the trust had become unenforceable and the
property should revert to the testator's heirs. The park was thereafter closed
to public use.
20. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810): "If the title be plainly deduced
from a legislative act, which the legislature might constitutionally pass, if

the act be clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court, sitting as a
court of law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual against another
founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of the
impure motives which influenced certain members of the legislature which
passed the law."
21. Cases supporting this policy include the following: Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Tenney v. Bandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 (1940); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Sozinsky v. United States,

300 U.S. 506 (1937); Fox v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87 (1935);
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Smith v. Kansas Title & Trust Co.,
255 U.S. 180 (1921); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Ex parte
McCardle, 4 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on
'22
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.

However, several cases seem to suggest that motive is a legitimate consideration in determining the constitutionality of a statute. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,23 petitioners attacked the constitutionality of an act by which the Alabama legislature had redefined the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee. The redefined city
formed a 28-sided figure which excluded most Negro voters
while including most white voters. The Court declared the act to
be unconstitutional, stating that "'[a]cts generally lawful may
become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end.
S..24 Later, in School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp,25 a state statute required that schools begin
the day with Bible readings. The Court tested the constitutionality of the act by inquiring into its purpose and effect. 26 Subsequently, the same test was applied in Epperson v. Arkansas,2
wherein the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting the teaching
of Darwinism in public schools after determining that the pur28
pose of the statute was to promote fundamentalist Christianity.
In the instant case, the majority first held that closing the
public pools was not a denial of equal protection of the laws. In
reaching this decision, the Court noted the lack of an affirmative
duty on the municipality to maintain these public facilities. 29 The
Court also found persuasive the fact that the Jackson city council,
22. O'Brien was convicted for burning his draft card. The majority held
that such burning frustrated the substantial governmental interest In
keeping adequate records. O'Brien argued that the legislation was unconstitu-

tional because the purpose was to suppress freedom of speech. The Court
rejected this proposition calling "inquiries into motives or purposes . . . a
hazardous
23. 364
24. Id.
25. 374

matter." 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
U.S. 339 (1960).
at 347.
U.S. 203 (1963).

26. "The test may be stated as follows: What are the purpose and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition
of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power circumscribed by the Constitution." Id. at 222.
27. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

28. In declaring the act to be unlawful the Court stated that "[tlhe
State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for Its public schools
does not carry with it the right to prohibit . . . the teaching of a scientific

theory where that prohibition is based on reasons that violate the First
Amendment." Id. at 107. (Emphasis added.)

29. "It should be noted first that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty on a State to
begin to operate or to continue to operate swimming pools." Palmer v.
Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1942 (1971).
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unlike the school board in Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County,80 exerted no control over the pools after
their closing.81 That the city council later transferred two of the
pools to people who apparently did discriminate 2 did not amount
to a denial of equal protection because the council had not authorized or encouraged the private owners to discriminate. 83 Hence,
the closing did not appear to be a subterfuge by which the Jack84
son public pools could be maintained on a segregated basis.

Secondly, the Court held that the closing did not violate the
equal protection clause on the basis of "unconstitutional" motives.
Relying on United States v. O'Brien,85 the Court pointed to the
difficulty of ascertaining the sole motivation of the city councilmen and to the general futility of determining motives and pur30. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
31. "This record supports no intimation that Jackson has not completely and finally ceased running swimming pools for all time. Unlike Prince
Edward County, Jackson has not pretended to close public pools only to run
them under a 'private' label ....
[T]here Is nothing here to show the city Is
directly or Indirectly Involved in the funding or operation of either pool. If
the time ever comes when Jackson attempts to run segregated public pools
either directly or Indirectly, or participates In a subterfuge whereby pools
are nominally run by 'private parties' but actually by the city, relief will be
available in the federal courts." Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1943-44
(1971).
32. Of the original five pools that were closed, one had been leased from
the local YMCA. When the lease was surrendered, it appears that the YMCA
allowed only white patrons to swim. A second pool was subsequently owned
and operated by Jackson State College, and opened to the predominately

black student body.
33. Petitioners had urged the type of encouragement found In Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Reitman, California had adopted a constitutional amendment allowing private Individuals to discriminate on racial
grounds in real estate transactions. The Court concluded that the adoption
of the amendment "was legislative action which authorized private discrimination and made the state at least a partner In the Instant act of discrimination." Id. at 375. This state involvement was considered prohibitive even
though It encouraged rather than commanded discrimination.
34. The Palmer Court found no encouragement of discrimination by
the city and rejected any implication of a conspiracy to discriminate
between the city council and the YMCA. The Court stated: "The implication of petitioner's argument appears to be that the fact that the city
turned over to the YMCA a pool it had previously leased Is sufficient to
show automatically that the city had conspired with the YMCA to deprive
Negroes of the opportunity to swim in integrated pools. Possibly in a case
where the city and the YMCA were both parties, a court could find that
the city engaged In a subterfuge, and that liability could be fastened on
it as an active participant in a conspiracy with the YMCA. We need not
speculate upon such a possibility, for there is no such finding here, and
it does not appear from this record that there was evidence to support
such a finding." Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1944 (1971).
35. 391 U.S. 867 (1968). See note 22 supra.
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poses.8 Rather than attempt such an inquiry, the Court examined the effect of the closing upon all citizens of Jackson and
found that the closing had an equal effect on both the blacks and
87
the whites of the city.
Justice White filed a lengthy dissent in which he rejected
the city's justification for closing the pools, viz., that the pools
could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated
basis, and further declared that the action was solely to avoid a
lawful order to desegregate. 88 In condoning inquiry into legislative motivation, Justice White asserted that state action could
not be sustained without a showing that the action was taken to
accomplish a permissible state purpose.39 Furthermore, Justice
White felt that to uphold such closings would be to deter Negroes
from future judicial actions because Negroes could reasonably
36. "It is difficult or Impossible for any court to determine the 'sole'
or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators.
Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law Is
struck down for this reason, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons." Palmer
v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1945 (1971).
37. Id. "Here the record indicates only that Jackson once ran segregated
public swimming pools and that no public pools are now maintained by the
city. Moreover, there is no evidence in this record to show that the city is
not covertly aiding the maintenance and operation of pools which are private in name only. It shows no state action affecting blacks differently from
whites."
38. Justice Black's opinion expressed the view of five members of the
Court. In addition to Justice White's dissent, Chief Justice Burger concurred
and added that it was impermissible to subject every decision of a local governing body closing public facilities to a motivational analysis. Justice Blackmun concurred, emphasizing the facts that other facilities had been desegregated; that a swimming pool was not an essential public facility; and that
the pools were being operated at a deficit. Justice Douglas dissented, relying
mainly on the ninth amendment as providing a right of access to public recreation facilities which could not be taken away by the local government.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and White, dissented because
he felt the opinion was in conflict with the policy of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The majority recognized the fact that there was
"substantial evidence in the record" to support the conclusion that the pools
could not be operated safely and economically on an integrated basis. The
lower court had examined the operating costs, and it was shown there that
the average annual loss to the city was $11,700.00 for the period 1960-1962.
Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1969).
39. "I am quite unpersuaded by the majority's assertion that it is impermissible to impeach the otherwise valid act of closing municipal swimming
pools by resort to evidence of invidious purpose or motive." Palmer v.
Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1953 (1971) (dissenting opinion). In citing Judge
Wisdom's dissenting opinion in the lower court, 419 F.2d 1222, 1237 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1969), Justice White states further that "'[ilf the facts state that city
has acted in good faith for economic or other nonracial reasons, the action
would have no overtones of racial degradation and would therefore not
offend the Constitution.'" 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1962 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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fear that other public facilities would also be closed rather than
integrated. 40
In its application of the equal protection clause, the Palmer
Court recognized an important distinction which seemed to be
the crucial factor in its determination that the closing of Jackson's public swimming pools was not a denial of equal protection
of the laws: 41 the lack of continued maintenance and control
over the facilities by the state after the transfer into private
hands rendered the closing constitutional. This factor appeared
to be controlling in Evans v. Newton, 2 where the Court stated
that "[i]f the municipality remains entwined in the management
or control of the park, it remains subject to the restraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . .. ,,43 and in Griffin,44 where "closing
the Prince Edward schools and meanwhile contributing to the
support of the private segregated white schools that took their
place denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws. '45
It thus appears that the Supreme Court has developed a test
to determine whether or not the closing of public facilities will
constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. Such a closing
will be unconstitutional only when some type of control, maintenance, or continued action is exercised by the local government
after closure. 46 It was the lack of such control that made the
closing in Palmer constitutional. However, it seems that the
Court's test will be limited to those facilities which do not serve
essential public functions. The Court noted that the local govern40. "It Is evident that closing a public facility after a court has ordered
its desegregation has an unfortunate impact on the minority considering
initiation of further suits or filing complaints with the Attorney General. As
Judge Wisdom said, 'the price of protest is high. Negroes * * * now know
that they risk losing even segregated public facilities if they dare to protest
* *0 segregated public parks, segregated public libraries, or other segregated
facilities. They must first decide whether they wish to risk living without
the facility altogether * * 0' 419 F.2d at 1236 (dissenting opinion). It Is difficult to measure the extent of this impact, but It is surely present and surely
we should not ignore it. The action of the city in this case interposes a
major deterrent to seeking judicial or executive help in eliminating racial
restrictions on the use of public facilities. As such, it is illegal under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1967 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
41. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
42. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See text accompanying note 18 supra.
43. Id. at 301.
44. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
45. Id. at 232.
46. See text accompanying notes 30 and 31 mupra.
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ment has no obligation to maintain swimming pools. 47 However,

the question of whether or not there is a duty to maintain certain public facilities which could be termed essential was not
answered by the Court. There is no provision in the Constitution
that establishes such a duty, but perhaps a duty has arisen out of
tradition and custom. If so, then the closing of a vital public
facility, such as a public school system, would itself be unconstitutional.48 It is submitted that the Court has failed to correlate
sufficiently the application of the test with the duty to maintain
the facility. Hence, when applied to more vital public facilities,
the adequacy of the test is questionable.
In its rejection of judicial inquiry into legislative motivation, the Court has reiterated a time-honored doctrine. 49 Although
prior cases have used such phrases as "purpose and the primary
effect," 50 "reasons that violate," 51 and "accomplish an unlawful
end, '52 all of which suggest that the Court has considered the
motives and purposes behind an act in determining its constitutionality, the Court was actually focusing on the effect of the
statute in question. Substantiation for this conclusion is found
in United States v. O'Brien, 3 where it is stated that "[t]hese
cases stand,5 4 not for the proposition that legislative motive is
a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that
the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional." 55 Furthermore, "the purpose of the legislation
was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect-the 'necessary
scope and operation,'

. . .

abridged constitutional rights.

'56

47. The majority stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty on a State to
begin to operate or to continue to operate swimming pools." Palmer v.
Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1942 (1971).
48. If the lack of constitutional authority precludes the existence of such

a duty, then presumably a state could close its school system and transfer it
into private hands. As long as the state exerted no maintenance or control
after transfer, then the act would be constitutional under the Palmer test.
Thus the application of the test hinges on the existence of a duty to maintain
the facility.
49. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
50. School Dist. of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See text accompanying note 26 supra.
51. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). See text accompanying
note 28 supra.
52. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
53. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
54. Chief Justice Warren was referring to Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
55. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
56. Id. at 385.
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Historically, the Court has applied this "effect" test to determine the constitutionality of statutes. 57 Recently, some writers
have suggested that motivation can be relevant 58 and that "purpose" may be used to more effectively determine the effects of
an act. 59 It is submitted, however, that inquiry into anything
beyond the inevitable effects of an act is a "hazardous matter"
indeed. 0 Such inquiry would subject the doctrine of equal pro57. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffmann, 268 U.S. 76, 83 (1925): "In passing on the constitutionality of a state law, its effect must be judged in light
of its practical application to the affairs of men as they are ordinarily conducted." Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 237 (1917): "The
question whether a state law deprives a party of rights secured by the Federal Constitution depends not upon how it is characterized, but upon its operation and effect." New York v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 658, 691 (1898): "In a legal
sense the object or purpose of legislation is to be determined by its natural
and reasonable effect, whatever may have been the motives upon which legislators acted." Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 320 (1890): "Upon the authority of those cases, and others that could be cited, it is our duty to inquire, in
respect to the statute before us, not only whether there is a real or substantial relation between its avowed objects and the means devised for attaining
those objects, but whether by its necessary or natural operation it impairs or
destroys rights secured by the Constitution of the United States."
58. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1281-82 (1970): "I have suggested that the motivation of
legislators and other government officials is relevant in cases where (1) the
governmental choice under attack is not subject from the outset-that is,
simply because a choice has been made and someone has been Injured by it
-to the demand for a legitimate defense and (2) the group whose disadvantaging is raised by way of objection is one to which the government owes no
affirmative duty of accommodation, but simply an obligation of 'neutrality.'
I have further suggested (3) that proof of unconstitutional motivation properly functions only to trigger a theretofore inapplicable burden of legitimate
defense. The suggestion of this section is that the three numbered limitations
delineate the only situation in which motivation constitutes the appropriate
constitutional reference and define the only way in which it can properly
function."
59. Note, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1892-93 (1970): "A more manageable suggestion is to attempt to incorporate purpose into the present process of judicial review based upon the effects which flow from the terms of legislation.
Purpose can be quite useful in helping courts to take account of the full
range of effects which flow from a given piece of legislation. In whatever
manner a court chooses to analyze those effects-whether it chooses to 'balance' the bad and the good, to make one effect absolute, or to decide that
the good might have been achieved at less cost-judicial performance will be
improved by more sensitive determination of the effects of an act. Consideration of purpose will not answer whether the effects of an act are constitutional. But purpose may help a court to determine what those effects will be."
60. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). One commentator
has aptly described it: "Legislative motive, moreover, Is such an awesome
conception that it may conceivably also comprise the separate motives of
legislators .... It also embraces all the motives innate In the interests, both
Individual and collective, that eventuate in the very introduction of a bill in
the legislature. Only thereafter does It directly enter on the motives of the
legislators and on their interpretations (interpolations) of the motives of
all who have influenced them during the actual passage of legislation. To
assume that these two hundred or two hundred thousand or two million
motives can be truly and accurately known and somehow then synthesized
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tection to varying and inconsistent standards depending on the
motives or purposes behind the particular statute. Not only is
it difficult to determine the sole motivation behind a legislative
enactment, but it is also futile to judicially attempt to invalidate
the law because of improper legislative motives. Presumably,
the law could be re-enacted for valid motives and, thus, become
constitutional. 61 However, if the Court continues to rely upon
the effects of the statute, the standard will remain constant and
judicial inquiry will be limited to an area within its proper
bounds.
W. Michael Adams
FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY OF THE WIFE FOR COMMUNITY
INCOME EARNED BY THE HUSBAND

Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell lived under Louisiana's community
of gains from 1946 until its termination by judicial separation
from bed and board in August 1961. Later, Mrs. Mitchell renounced the community of gains leaving Mr. Mitchell responsible
for all assets and liabilities contracted during the existence of
the community. Although he earned taxable income from 1955
to 1959, Mr. Mitchell failed to file federal tax returns. In an
attempt to collect one-half of the taxes and penalties owed on
this income, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency 1 against
Mrs. Mitchell. The Tax Court 2 determined that Mrs. Mitchell's
tax liability was created when she became owner of the property,
and that she has become the immediate owner of one-half of all
community property upon its acquisition. The Fifth Circuits
reversed, holding that Mrs. Mitchell's renunciation avoided any
tax liability on income falling into the community of gains. On
into one composite legislative motive is at once absurd, irresponsible, and
scientifically indefensible. It amounts to sclentism of the worst variety."
Howell, Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in the Invalidation of a
Civil Rights Statute, 47 VA. L. REV. 439, 450-51 (1961).

61. Bee note 36 supra.
1. A deficiency is the excess of a given tax over the net amount previouslyreported and assessed or collected without assessment. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 6211. Deficiencies are formally asserted by the government through
an assessment. An assessment occurs when the district director signs the
assessment list, and this fixes the government's tax claim. Mim. 3229, 111-2
CUM. BULL. 293, 294 (1924).
2. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 641 (1969).

3. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).

